












The Centre for Health Economics Research and Evaluation (CHERE) was established in 
1991.  CHERE is a centre of excellence in health economics and health services research. It 
is a joint Centre of the Faculties of Business and Nursing, Midwifery and Health at the 
University of Technology, Sydney, in collaboration with Central Sydney Area Health 
Service. It was established as a UTS Centre in February, 2002. The Centre aims to 
contribute to the development and application of health economics and health services 
research through research, teaching and policy support. CHERE’s research program 
encompasses both the theory and application of health economics. The main theoretical 
research theme pursues valuing benefits, including understanding what individuals value 
from health and health care, how such values should be measured, and exploring the social 
values attached to these benefits. The applied research focuses on economic and the 
appraisal of new programs or new ways of delivering and/or funding services. CHERE’s 
teaching includes introducing clinicians, health services managers, public health 
professionals and others to health economic principles. Training programs aim to develop 
practical skills in health economics and health services research. Policy support is provided 
at all levels of the health care system by undertaking commissioned projects, through the 
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The inter-relationship between private health insurance cover and hospital 
utilisation is complex.  The current policy approach in Australia appears to rely on 
relatively simple models of the relationships between health insurance coverage, 
and public and private hospital use.  There is considerable evidence of 
unexplained heterogeneity among the privately insured population.  Heterogeneity 
of preferences is likely to be important not just in determining the uptake of 
private health insurance, but also the impact of changes in private health insurance 
on the use of private treatment.  A number of studies have used attitudinal 
variables to model heterogeneity of preferences in other contexts.  This study uses 
the 2001 ABS National Health Survey to identify ‘types’ among the insured 
population using their stated reasons for purchasing private health insurance.  We 
find that insurance type is significantly associated with hospital utilisation, 
particularly the probability of being admitted as a public or private patient.  We 
also find that the government’s insurance incentives were more attractive to 
particular types of the insured population.  This has implications for the 
effectiveness of the insurance incentives and for the design of policies that aim to 
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In the past decade, Australia has undergone a series of policy changes in relation to 
private health insurance, aimed at increasing the level of private health insurance 
coverage. These policy changes have been widely documented (Hall et al., 1999; Hall 
and Savage, 2005; Butler, 2002;). They were introduced in response to a progressive 
decline in private health insurance over the period since the introduction of Medicare, 
and at least in part, because of a perception that this decline placed additional pressure 
on the public hospital system. Their overall impact has been to increase the level of 
private health insurance from just over 30% of the population in December 1998 to 
43% of the population in December 2000 and to change the composition of the 
insured population (Butler, 2002).  
 
The inter-relationship between private health insurance cover and hospital utilisation 
and expenditure is complex. Under Medicare, all Australian residents are entitled to 
free public hospital treatment, regardless of whether they have private health 
insurance. Private health insurance covers treatment in a private hospital or as a 
private patient in a public hospital, allowing choice of doctor and potentially shorter 
waiting times for some procedures. There are generally significant out-of-pocket costs 
associated with private treatment, creating disincentives to use private treatment even 
for those with private health insurance.  The policy changes introduced in the last 
decade have made this even more complex. The initial policy, introduced in 1997, 
which involved a combination of tax penalties for higher income individuals without 
private health insurance and tax subsidies for low income individuals who purchased 
private health insurance, was replaced in 1998 by a non-means tested 30% rebate on 
private health insurance. The tax penalties to higher income individuals remained, and 
in fact were extended to cover new policies with high front end deductibles in 2000. 
The combined effect of the tax penalties and subsidies means that for high income 
individuals the net premium can be negative. Thus, private health insurance purchase 
may not be related to expectations of use of hospital services, particularly private 
hospital services.  
  
The final policy change was the introduction of age based risk rating or ‘lifetime 
health cover’, requiring firms to vary premiums with age at entry. It was accompanied 
by an extensive government advertising campaign and appeared to have the most 
significant impact on cover, although it is difficult to disentangle the effect of the 
different policy changes within aggregate data. Identifying the impact of the policy 
changes on private health insurance cover is made more complex by the fact that there 
is significant churning in the market, in terms of individuals who enter and exit the 
private health insurance market in response to incentives they face at particular points 
in time.  
 
The current policy approach appears to rely on relatively simple models of the 
relationships between health insurance coverage, public and private hospital 
utilisation and health expenditure, which do not capture the complexity of the choices 
facing individuals. For example, after the introduction of Medicare, private hospital 
usage grew more rapidly than public hospital usage. In the ten years to 1995-96, there 
was an 81% increase in private hospital usage compared to a 46% rise for public 
hospitals. Although the rate of insurance coverage fell from 50% in 1984 to just over 
30% in 1998, the share of hospital expenditure covered by private health insurance 
remained relatively constant.    
 
While a link exists between private health insurance coverage and the demand for 
health services, the health insurance premium, which has been the focus of 
government policy, is a relatively small component of the overall price. The choice of 
whether to insure depends as well on the probability distribution over health states, 
the ‘net’ prices of the various hospital options, the waiting time for free treatment in a 
public hospital, and other socio-economic variables. The insurance choice must be 
made before the health state is realised. The choice of type of hospital, patient status 
and the quantity of hospital services consumed are subsequent decisions that do not 
depend solely on insurance status. 
 
Further, heterogeneity of preferences is likely to be important not just in determining 
the uptake of private health insurance, but also the impact of changes in private health 
insurance on the use of private treatment. To develop a better understanding of the 
relationship between health insurance cover and health care utilization and 
expenditure in Australia, it is important to model not just the complexity of incentives 
facing individuals (see for example Ellis and Savage, 2005), but also to capture 
heterogeneity of preferences. Studies in other countries provide support for the use of 
attitudinal variables to explain demand for health insurance and hospital utilization 
(Propper, 1989, 1993; Harmon and Nolan, 2001). However, it is rarely possible to 
combine attitudinal data with other relevant socio-demographic variables at the 
individual level.  
 
While not directly asking respondents about their attitudes to public and private 
treatment or to private health insurance, data from the 2001 ABS National Health 
Survey provide the opportunity to examine this issue in the Australian setting, in the 
context of the substantial changes to private health insurance policy that have taken 
place over the last decade. Within the survey, respondents aged 15 or over were asked 
to indicate their reasons for purchasing or not purchasing private health insurance. 
This study uses these data to identify different categories (types) of consumer in terms 
of their reasons for having health insurance. We investigate whether identification of 
type (in terms of reasons for purchasing insurance) improves the modeling of 
unexplained heterogeneity in preferences for private health insurance, and whether 
insurance type influences use of the health system and timing of insurance purchase.  
 
 
1  Heterogeneity in the insured population 
The decision to purchase health insurance is based on expected utility gain. A simple 
model would predict that the probability of purchase, or difference between the utility 
of buying versus not buying, would increase with income and decrease with higher 
premiums. Also we expect individuals with higher expected need for health services 
and individuals who are more risk averse to be more likely to purchase health 
insurance. Individuals are also likely to vary in their evaluation of the expected 
benefits from having private health insurance. Some individuals may prefer private 
treatment because of the ability to choose their doctor, or because of perceived higher 
quality of service offered by private hospitals, or to avoid long waiting times 
associated with many elective procedures in the public system. Other individuals, who 
would otherwise have little interest in private health insurance, may choose to 
purchase insurance purely because of the financial incentives that have been imposed 
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by government policies.  Specifically, for many high income people the net premium 
may be negative.  
 
Thus there is a range of motivations for why different individuals might choose to 
purchase private health insurance. There is considerable evidence of unexplained 
heterogeneity of preferences among the privately insured population. For example, a 
robust finding in empirical studies of the demand for private health insurance is that 
individuals with higher self-assessed health status are more likely to have private 
health insurance, controlling for other covariates such as income, education, age and 
the existence of co-morbidities ( Doiron et al 2006; Barrett and Conlon, 2003; 
Shmueli, 2001; Harmon and Nolan, 2001). Moreover, while a higher probability of 
having private health insurance is positively associated with variables such as income, 
education and health status, a number of studies have found that variables such as 
voting preferences and attitudes to public/private cover are also significantly 
correlated with insurance cover (Propper, 1993, 2000; Burchardt and Propper, 1999;  
Harmon and Nolan, 2001). 
 
A key premise of our analysis is that this heterogeneity is likely to be important not 
just in determining the uptake of private health insurance, but also on the impact of 
having private health insurance on the use of private treatment. This is most clearly 
illustrated if we consider two ‘types’ of individual with private health insurance who 
will later be referred to as ‘choice’ and ‘financial’ types. Choice types are those who 
value the attributes that distinguish the private and public systems such as choice of 
doctor. On the other hand financial types are those individuals whose primary 
motivation for purchasing private health insurance is to avoid penalties imposed by 
the government.  
 
How might we expect these two types to behave should they need to be admitted to 
hospital? For choice types it seems clear. They have a preference for private care and 
have insurance in order to better afford the costs associated with being a private 
patient should they need to be admitted to hospital. The situation for the financial 
types is not nearly as clear. On one hand many of these individuals might very well be 
quite satisfied with the public system and the services it provides and hence simply 
not use their private coverage when admitted to hospital. On the other hand, 
Vaithianathan (2002) stressed the importance of individuals who have historically 
self-insured. In other words they have a preference for private care but have felt 
private health insurance has not offered them good value presumably because they 
tend to be younger, healthier and wealthier than average. For these individuals they 
have been enticed into purchasing private health insurance by the policy changes but 
would have used the private health system even without their change of insurance 
status. 
 
A number of studies have used attitudinal variables to model heterogeneity of 
preferences. Harris and Keane (1999) found that inclusion of attitudinal variables 
(stated preferences expressed as responses to attitudinal questions about the 
importance of particular attributes) substantially improved model fit in an analysis of 
choice of health care plans in the United States. Ahn et al. (1999) found that the 
probability of finding a job was significantly higher among unemployed workers with 
positive migration attitudes, but that duration of unemployment was not a significant 
determinant of migration attitude, even after controlling for unobserved fixed 
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individual heterogeneity. Hersch and Pickton (1995) found that proxy variables for 
risk attitude (smoking and seat-belt use) were significant in explaining the 
compensating differential in the wage-risk trade-off for risky jobs. Darnhofer, et al. 
(2005) examined willingness of farmers in Austria to convert to organic farming. 
They identified five types of farmers, characterised by their farming strategies and 
values, the “committed conventional”, “pragmatic conventional”, “environment 
conscious but not organic”, “pragmatic organic” and “committed organic”. This study 
illustrates the importance of taking into account heterogeneity in farmers’ attitudes, 
preferences and goals in understanding choice of farming method. 
 
We are able to explore these issues by exploiting a question in the 2001 ABS National 
Health Survey that asked respondents: “What are all the reasons you are covered by 
insurance?”.  Typical empirical studies rely on standard socio-demographics to 
capture the types of heterogeneity that we have identified. Here responses to this 
question are used to more directly segment the insured population into different types 
according to their stated motivation for having private health insurance. 
 
 
2  National Health Survey Data and Identification of Types 
The 2001 ABS National Health Survey is part of a series of national surveys of the 
health status and health care utilization of the Australian population (previous studies 
were conducted in 1977-78; 1983; 1989-90 and 1995).  It involved a representative 
sample of 17,918 private dwellings across Australia, with information collected on 
one adult from each household, all children aged 0-6 years and one child aged 7-17 
years, including data on health status, health related behaviours, use of health services 
and demographic and socio-demographic characteristics (26,862 respondents in total). 
The sample was restricted to respondents over the age of 18, giving 17,694 
observations. 
 
All respondents in our sample who indicated they had private health insurance cover 
were asked the question “What are all the reasons you are covered by insurance?”. 
Respondents could indicate more than one reason. A corresponding question was 
asked of respondents who indicated they did not currently have private health 
insurance cover. Table 1 summarises the overall frequency of reasons for having 
insurance cover among the 8,328 respondents who had private hospital cover. 
 
These data provide valuable information about reasons for purchasing private health 
insurance. Our approach is to use the reasons to identify types, that is a set of 
mutually exclusive categories of reasons for purchasing insurance, such that each 
respondent could be assigned to one category of reason (a preference type). The 
average number of reasons per respondent is 1.9. Therefore single reasons do not in 
themselves identify types. Table 2 provides a summary of responses in terms of the 
number of reasons given per respondent. Thus, the identification of types was based 
on two stages. The first stage involved forming judgements about which reasons are 
related in terms of preferences. The second stage was to determine empirically which 
reasons are associated.  
 
A complexity that arises when individuals are asked to answer all the reasons for 
making a particular consumption decision is that it is not possible to determine 
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whether the respondent sees each reason he/she ticks as a separate reason for the 
decision (relating to a different objective) or whether he/she ticks all reasons that are 
close approximations to the underlying reason. Further, it is not possible to identify 
whether there is a primary reason and others are secondary. For example, although 
reasons B and H relate to different aspects of the financial cost of private health 
insurance, a respondent who is motivated by financial factors may tick both of these, 
and it is not possible to determine whether both are equally important, or whether 
there is one primary reason. Therefore in the first stage we attempted to group the 
reasons into related categories, that is, identify which reasons appear to relate to 
similar potential objectives in the respondent’s utility function. We grouped the 
reasons into five types as summarised in Table 3.  
 
Reasons C, D and F were judged to relate to choice of private treatment (choice type). 
Reasons B, E, H and I were judged to relate to reducing the financial costs of health 
insurance or health care (financial type). Reasons J and K were judged to relate to 
concerns about health status and the role of private health insurance in facilitating 
access to care (health type). Reasons A and G were judged to relate to underlying risk 
aversion (security type). A small group of respondents selected only ‘Other reason’ 
(other type). Clearly these categories are based on subjective assessments.  
   
For respondents who give only one reason for purchasing health insurance (46%), 
allocation of reason to type is straightforward. Just over 44% of respondents gave two 
or three reasons, with a small minority giving more than 3 reasons. In the second stage 
we focused on respondents who had identified up to 3 reasons (90% of the sample), 
and for each reason we calculated frequencies with which that reason was combined 
with each one or two other reasons. Examples are presented in Appendix A.  
 
Two features emerged. First, there is empirical support for the categories identified in 
stage 1. For example, of the 2,557 respondents who gave two reasons, almost half 
gave ‘Security/protection/peace of mind’ as one reason and, of these, the highest other 
frequency is for “Always had it”. The next most common selection by those with two 
reasons (about 20%) is “Choice of doctor” and it is most commonly associated with 
“Allow treatment as private patient in hospital” and “Shorter wait for treatment”. 
 
The second feature to emerge is that there is a spread of responses, and that it is not 
empirically supportable to identify only 5 unique types of consumer. For example, 
respondents often give both a security reason and a financial reason. We examined the 
co-occurrence of reasons to assign each respondent to a ‘single’ type or a 
‘combination’ type. A ‘single’ type respondent gives one or more reason that belong 
to the same type (Security, Choice, Financial, Health). A ‘combination’ type 
respondent gives reasons that belong to two or more types.  
 
Respondents giving reason L (other) were assigned to a type based on their other 
reasons.   The exception to this was respondents who ticked only reason L. 
 
Table 4 summarises the final set of types identified. More than half of the sample 
(56.1%) is grouped into a single type, with the majority of these being security types 
(24.6%). Large proportions identified only financial reasons (15%) or only choice 
reasons (13.5%). Relatively few identified only health reasons (3%). Single type and 
two-type respondents cover 87.4% of the sample. Choice/Security types comprise 
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12% of the sample; Choice/Financial types comprise 6.6% of the sample and 
Financial/Security types comprise 6.5%. Perhaps the most striking feature is that those 
giving health reasons for insurance purchase are a small group. 
 
3  Models and Results 
Modeling admission to hospital 
We examine the impact of private health insurance on probability of admission to 
hospital. Assume that each individual has an unobserved utility associated with each 
of three discrete outcomes; not admitted, admitted as a Medicare patient and admitted 
as a private patient. The utility index is assumed to depend on personal characteristics 
in addition to private health insurance status. Individuals then choose the alternative 
with the highest utility. With a linear random utility model this implies: 
 
  2 , 1 , 0 ; ) 1 ( = + + ′ = j h x U ij j i j i ij ε γ β   
where x represents a vector of socio-demographic control variables and h is a dummy 
variable for private health (hospital) insurance status. Under the assumption that the 
disturbances are distributed as iid type I extreme value, this random utility framework 
motivates the use of the multinomial logit model.  
 
Under this model specification, the probability that the i
th individual falls into the j
th 
category is given by: 
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The base category is taken to be “not admitted” so that β0 and γ0 are normalized to 
zero.  The interpretation of the remaining coefficients is facilitated by considering the 
relative risk or odds ratio defined by: 
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Thus, the exponentiated value of a coefficient is the relative risk ratio for a one unit 
change in the corresponding variable where risk is measured as the probability of the 
individual choosing category j relative to the base category.  
 
Three models are estimated with Model 1 being the specification represented in 
equation (1).  Implicit in this specification is the assumption that the impact of private 
health insurance status on hospital admission does not vary over individuals. Using 
our categorization of types this assumption is relaxed. In Models 2 and 3 the insured 
are decomposed by creating dummies for insurance types. In Model 2 there are 6 
dummies for insurance status: a dummy for each of the ‘single’ types (choice, 
financial, security and health), a dummy for the ‘other’ category (those who ticked 
only ‘other’) and a dummy for all ‘combination’ types. In Model 3, the ‘combination 
types’ are further decomposed into separate dummies for each type, thus creating an 
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additional 10 insurance dummies. These are nested models, with Models 2 and 3 
collapsing to the Model 1 specification given in (1) only if the impact of private health 
insurance status on hospital admission does not vary over types.  
 
For estimation, the sample was further restricted by dropping 31 individuals for whom 
admission status (Medicare or private) is not known. Descriptive statistics for the 
socio-demographic controls are presented in Table 5. Table 6 presents the likelihood 
ratio tests comparing Models 1-3. From comparison of the models it is evident that 
inclusion of ‘single’ types significantly improves the fit of the model. Comparison of 
Models 2 and 3 shows that when the remaining insured group (those who could not be 
grouped into a single type) are further broken down according to their combination 
types, the fit of the model is again improved. This suggests that identification of the 
reasons for insurance adds to our understanding of the choice between public and 
private admission, by allowing us to model better the underlying heterogeneity in the 
insured population. There is clear statistical evidence that the impact of private health 
insurance status on admission choice varies by types. 
 
Table 7 presents the results for Model 3. Coefficient estimates are reported as relative 
risk ratios, that is the impact of each variable on the odds ratio. From Table 7 it can be 
seen that the socio-demographic variables have expected signs. The omitted 
categories are uninsured, male, aged less than 30, born in Australia, no post-school 
qualifications, single, unemployed, gross income unit income less than $400, and with 
excellent self assessed health. The socio-demographic controls are robust across the 
different specifications of the model.   
 
The addition of the type variables provides valuable information about the underlying 
heterogeneity among the insured. In Model 1 which included private insurance cover 
and socio-demographic controls, the relative risk ratio (relative to not admitted) was 
0.36 (p=0.000) for admission as a Medicare patient and 8.35 (p=0.000) for admission 
as a private patient. Thus, as would be expected, having private hospital insurance 
significantly increases the probability of being admitted as a private patient rather 
than a public patient.  However, when the insured are further decomposed into types 
in Models 2 and 3, while the underlying pattern that those with insurance are more 
likely to be admitted as private patients remains, it is evident that there is considerable 
variation in probability of admission across the types. Those who were classified as a 
“choice” type, either singly or in combination with another type, typically have much 
higher probabilities of admission as a private patient than other types. The probability 
of admission as a private patient is lowest among those who were classified as 
“financial”, “financial/health” and “financial/security”. This suggests that there is a 
group of consumers whose underlying reasons for having private health insurance 
relate to factors other than preference for treatment as a private patient, and that their 
choice behaviour in relation to hospital admission is related to this.  
 
Figure 1 depicts the relative risk ratios by type graphically, and Figure 2 presents the 
average predicted probability of admission by types. For example, consider the three 
types that account for the largest proportions of the insured: choice (13.5%), financial 
(15.0%) and security (24.6%). For those classified as financial, they have a low 
predicted probability of hospital admission, but importantly, if admitted, there is little 
difference in the average predicted probability of admission as a Medicare or a private 
patient. By contrast for those who are either choice or security types, the difference 
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between their probability of admission as a private patient and as a public patient is 
much larger.  
 
Figure 3 presents simulated admission probabilities by patient status for each type. 
The simulations are generated by assigning the type to each observation, while 
retaining the individual values for all other variables.  Thus, if all those with private 
health insurance were a financial type, there would be little difference between the 
probabilities of being admitted to hospital as a Medicare or a private patient.  
 
Modeling insurance choice and admission to hospital 
Private health insurance choice and utilisation of health services, such as hospital 
admission, would often be modeled jointly. The argument is that the insurance 
dummy in equation (1) is endogenous because there are unobserved factors that affect 
insurance choice and also utilisation. In order to counter this endogeneity problem and 
hence to produce consistent estimates, an instrumental variable approach is 
recommended. In studies such as Meer and Rosen (2004) and Deb et al., (2006), 
employment characteristics are used as instruments for insurance status. While such 
instrument choices may be reasonable in these US studies, although this is not without 
dispute; see Joyce (2004), it is not a viable choice in Australia where private health 
insurance is rarely provided by employers.    
 
Model 1 depicted in equation (1) is likely to suffer from the problem of endogeneity. 
The problem arises because of the presence of common unobservables in both the 
insurance choice and utilisation equations. These unobservables are typically assumed 
to be factors such as preferences for the services provided by the private system, 
degree of risk aversion and expected future need for the health system. It is difficult to 
find appropriate instruments for insurance status in standard data sets. The types 
variables contained in our data capture variations in factors mentioned above and 
hence can be used to ameliorate the problem of endogeneity. Models 2 and 3 include 
interactions of type dummy variables with the insurance dummy. Their inclusion in 
this manner means that they serve as proxies helping control for the missing variables 
and thus reducing the impact of any unobservables associated with utilisation.  
 
While we recognize that endogeneity bias remains a potential problem, as the type 
variables do not span the whole distribution of common unobservables, we argue that 
our approach is less susceptible than usual to this criticism. What’s more the impact of 
the endogeneity bias would have to be considerable in order to eliminate the 
differences in effects that have been documented.   
   
Modeling time in cover for the insured 
Given that the inclusion of information about the reasons for insurance significantly 
improves the modeling of probability of admission to hospital, it is of interest to 
identify whether the underlying differences between the insurance types can be 
explained.  The major changes to policy in relation to health insurance have changed 
the incentives for uptake of private health insurance, such that for some individuals, 
the price of private health insurance is negative. The introduction of lifetime health 
cover may also have changed the threshold in relation to risk aversion as an 
underlying reason for private health insurance. Some evidence in relation to these 
factors is found by examining the distribution of duration of private health insurance 
cover across the insurance types, as presented in Figure 4. As would be expected, the 
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majority of the insured have been insured for more than 5 years. However, this varies 
considerably across the types. In particular, those who indicated choice reasons (either 
singly or in combination) have generally had insurance for more than 5 years, 
suggesting an underlying preference for access to private treatment (or underlying risk 
aversion). By contrast, those who indicated financial reasons (either singly or in 
combination) are much more likely to have been insured for less than 2 years, which 
corresponds in these data with the timing of the introduction of the private health 
insurance rebate. The exception is when financial reasons are combined with choice 
reasons. 
 
We examine the impact of type on time in health insurance cover, for the insured 
subsample.  Multinomial logit models are estimated, where the dependent variable is 
time in cover, with four categories: less than one year, one to less than two years, two 
to less than five years and five or more years. The base category is five or more years. 
Models are estimated with and without controls. Table 8 presents the relative risk 
ratios for the model including controls, and Figure 5 summarises the results for each 
type, for the models with and without controls. It can be seen that insurance duration 
varies with type. In particular, financial types (single and combination) have a 
significantly higher probability of shorter insurance durations (less than 2 years).   
 
4  Conclusions 
While government measures to increase private health insurance coverage in Australia 
increased cover by around 50%, it is less clear what they have achieved in terms of 
changing the mix of public and private utilisation. This paper demonstrates that there 
is not a simple relationship between insurance status and private hospital utilisation 
and that the insured population cannot be assumed to behave homogeneously in 
response to policy measures. We identify four main types of consumers (choice, 
financial, security and health) who cover 57% of the insured population and a number 
of combination types.  We find that the mix of types varies across insurance durations. 
For example, those with shorter durations of insurance cover are far more likely to 
have joined for financial reasons; and financial types are less likely to choose the 
private system when admitted to hospital than choice types who are more likely to 
have joined before the recent insurance incentives.   
 
It cannot be assumed that those who were attracted to insurance by the government’s 
incentives will have the same pattern of utilisation as long term enrollees. Predictions 
of hospital utilisation based on the behaviour of those who were insured before the 
incentives are misleading and marginal changes in insurance coverage are unlikely to 
be good indicators of changes in the use of the private system. When we do not 
distinguish between types, the insured have relative risks of being admitted as a 
Medicare and private patient of 0.4 and 8.4 respectively. When the insured are 
decomposed into types, there are large and significant differences in these relative 
risks across types. While choice types are about four times more likely to be admitted 
as a private patient than a Medicare patient, financial types have almost equal 
probabilities of admission as a private or a Medicare patient.  
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Table 1: Frequency of reasons for private health insurance cover among 
respondents with private hospital cover 
Rank  Reason for private health 
insurance cover  Frequency Percentage  Cumulative
percentage 
1  Security / protection peace of mind  3859  21.8  21.8 
2  Allow treatment as private patient 
in hospital  2132 12.1  33.9 
3  Choice of doctor  2117  12.0  45.8 
4  Always had it / parent pay it / 
condition of job  1891 10.7  56.5 
5  Shorter wait for treatment / concern 
over public hospital waiting lists  1880 10.6  67.1 
6  Provides benefits for ancillary 
services / extras  1461 8.3  75.4 
7  To gain government benefits / 
avoid extra Medicare levy  933 5.3 80.7 
8  Lifetime cover / avoid age 
surcharge  916 5.2 85.9 
9 Other  reason  780  4.4  90.3 
10  Elderly / getting older / likely to 
need treatment  631 3.6 93.8 
11 Other  financial  reasons  555  3.1  97.0 
12  Has other conditions that requires 
treatment  537 3.0 100.0 
 Total 17692  100   
 
 
Table 2: Number of reasons for private health insurance cover among 









1 3641  43.7  43.7 
2 2557  30.7  74.4 
3 1261  15.1  89.6 
4 535  6.4  96.0 
5 209  2.5  98.5 
6 77  0.9  99.4 
7 32  0.4  99.8 
8 13  0.2  100 
9 or more  4  0.0  100 
Total 8328  100   
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Table 3: Allocation of reasons for purchasing private health insurance to 
insurance types 
Type  Reason for private health insurance cover   Label 
Choice of doctor  C 
Allow treatment as private patient in hospital  D   
Choice  Shorter wait for treatment /concern over public hospital 
waiting lists 
F 
Lifetime cover / avoid age surcharge  B 
Provides benefits for ancillary services / extras  E 
To gain government benefits / avoid extra Medicare levy  H 
 
Financial 
Other financial reasons  I 
Has other conditions that requires treatment  J   
Health  Elderly / getting older / likely to need treatment  K 
Security / protection peace of mind  A   
Security  Always had it / parent pay it / condition of job  G 




Table 4: Types identified by reasons 
 
Type Frequency  Percentage 
Single Type  Choice  1124  13.5 
 Financial  1247  15.0 
 Health    254  3.0 
 Security  2048  24.6 
      
Combination Type Choice/Financial  547  6.6 
 (2 categories)  Choice/Health  139  1.7 
 Choice/Security  997  12.0 
 Financial/Health  125  1.5 
 Financial/Security  538  6.5 
 Health/Security  251  3.0 
      
Combination Type Choice/Financial/Health 65  0.8 
(3 categories)  Choice/Financial/Security 507  6.1 
 Choice/Health/Security  106  1.3 
 Financial/Health/Security  68  0.8 
      
Other Types  All reasons  77  0.9 
 Other  reason  235  2.8 
Total   8328  100 
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private insurance  0.47  0.50 
age30s 0.22  0.41 
age40s 0.21  0.41 
age50s 0.15  0.36 
age60s 0.11  0.31 
age70over 0.14  0.34 
female 0.55  0.50 
bornOther 0.27  0.44 
diploma 0.37  0.48 
degree 0.16  0.37 
couple 0.29  0.46 
sole parent  0.06  0.24 
couple with deps  0.26  0.44 
full time emp  0.43  0.50 
part time emp  0.17  0.37 
not in LF   0.37  0.48 
$400 to 599  0.11  0.32 
$600 to 799  0.10  0.30 
$800 to 999  0.08  0.28 
$1000 to 1499  0.14  0.35 
$1500 to 1999  0.07  0.26 
$2000 to 2499  0.03  0.16 
$2500+ 0.03  0.17 
income not stated  0.18  0.38 
Very Good  0.32  0.47 
Good 0.31  0.46 
Fair 0.15  0.35 
Poor 0.05  0.22 
Number LTC  2.81  1.71 
 
 
Table 6: Likelihood ratio tests for Models 1-3 










1  Insurance + 
controls  -7869.69 1065.91  60  .  . 
2  Single types + 
controls    -7837.53 64.33  70  10  18.31 
3  All types + 
controls  -7820.37 34.32  90  20  31.41 
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Table 7: Multinomial Logit Estimates for Probability of Admission (Model 3) 
   Medicare    Private 
Variable 
Relative 





Choice  0.319  0.060 0.000  12.088  1.472 0.000 
Financial  0.585  0.086 0.000  4.104  0.670 0.000 
Health  0.395  0.125 0.003  8.050  1.640 0.000 
Security  0.286  0.042 0.000  7.532  0.860 0.000 
ch_fin  0.377  0.096 0.000  8.085  1.403 0.000 
ch_hlth  0.373  0.173 0.034  14.252  3.295 0.000 
ch_sec  0.310  0.062 0.000  10.016  1.295 0.000 
fin_hlth 0.493  0.211  0.099  4.675  1.712 0.000 
fin_sec  0.205  0.067 0.000  5.402  1.037 0.000 
hlth_sec  0.386  0.122 0.003  6.603  1.405 0.000 
ch_fin_hlth 0.306  0.223  0.104  12.917  4.337 0.000 
ch_fin_sec  0.301  0.087 0.000  8.756  1.504 0.000 
ch_hlth_sec 0.478  0.224  0.115  13.746  3.561 0.000 
fin_hlth_sec 0.421  0.253  0.149 8.119  3.088 0.000 
all types  0.728  0.321  0.471  11.529  3.625 0.000 
only other  0.490  0.143 0.014  5.968  1.502 0.000 
age30s  0.596  0.055 0.000  0.924  0.122  0.548 
age40s  0.396  0.040 0.000  0.596  0.082 0.000 
age50s  0.408  0.047 0.000  0.673  0.094 0.005 
age60s  0.478  0.059 0.000  0.867  0.135  0.361 
age70over  0.493  0.058 0.000  1.363  0.208 0.043 
Female  1.181  0.076 0.010  1.043  0.077  0.565 
bornOther 0.999  0.066  0.982  0.810  0.064 0.008 
Diploma  1.221  0.078 0.002  1.084  0.081  0.283 
Degree 1.046  0.110  0.669  0.993  0.099  0.945 
Couple 0.961  0.077  0.620  0.918  0.079  0.321 
sole parent  1.213  0.150  0.119  1.108  0.219  0.606 
couple with 
deps  1.738  0.163 0.000  1.186  0.130  0.120 
full time 
emp  0.852 0.139  0.326  0.748  0.198  0.274 
part time 
emp 0.854  0.144  0.351  0.952  0.258  0.855 
not in LF   1.635  0.258 0.002  1.181  0.317  0.535 
$400 to 599  1.119  0.109  0.250  1.357  0.171 0.015 
$600 to 799  1.173  0.134  0.161  1.463  0.198 0.005 
$800 to 999  1.034  0.141  0.806  1.337  0.197 0.048 
$1000 to 
1499 0.938  0.122  0.625  1.412  0.194 0.012 
$1500 to 
1999  1.007 0.177  0.971  1.533  0.244 0.007 
$2000 to 
2499 0.796  0.237  0.445  1.188  0.269  0.446 
$2500+ 0.677  0.223  0.236  1.693  0.335 0.008 
income not 
stated 0.855  0.081  0.097  1.237  0.139  0.059 
Very Good  1.239  0.136  0.052  0.917  0.100  0.427 
Good  1.666  0.180 0.000  1.275  0.138 0.025 
Fair  2.439  0.288 0.000  2.057  0.253 0.000 




1.131  0.024 0.000    1.152  0.029 0.000 
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< 1 year 1-<2 years 2-<5 years >=5 years
  
  16  17
 
  Less than 1 year    1 to less than 2 years    2 to less than 5 years 
Variable RRR  P>|z|    RRR  P>|z|    RRR  P>|z| 
Choice  0.697  0.055   1.037  0.839   0.646  0.024 
Financial  13.792  0.000   12.618  0.000   2.012  0.000 
Health  1.895  0.011   2.568  0.000   1.121  0.704 
Security  0.599  0.002   0.741  0.070   0.511  0.000 
ch_fin 1.001  0.998    1.483  0.039   0.729  0.153 
ch_hlth 1.255  0.527    2.027  0.026   1.301  0.465 
ch_sec  0.468  0.000   0.598  0.009   0.472  0.000 
fin_hlth  8.275  0.000   7.084  0.000   1.894  0.112 
fin_sec  1.721  0.005   2.229  0.000   0.754  0.205 
hlth_sec 0.626  0.177    1.307  0.336    0.736  0.350 
ch_fin_hlth  2.878  0.003   2.030  0.073   0.000  1.000 
ch_fin_sec 0.795  0.293    1.107  0.612    0.392  0.000 
ch_hlth_sec 0.515  0.219    1.211  0.625    0.935  0.876 
fin_hlth_sec 1.864  0.109    1.740  0.169    0.556  0.347 
all types  1.605  0.255    2.387  0.020   0.401  0.220 
only other  2.484  0.000   2.488  0.000   1.186  0.488 
age30s 0.986  0.913    1.107  0.383    0.644  0.001 
age40s  0.535  0.000   0.586  0.000   0.270  0.000 
age50s  0.394  0.000   0.382  0.000   0.168  0.000 
age60s  0.180  0.000   0.161  0.000   0.130  0.000 
age70over  0.047  0.000   0.050  0.000   0.115  0.000 
Female  1.186  0.038   1.161  0.053   0.921  0.404 
bornOther  1.620  0.000   1.599  0.000   2.073  0.000 
Diploma 0.875  0.115    0.992  0.916    1.048  0.660 
Degree  0.719  0.001   0.772  0.007   0.913  0.465 
Couple 1.013  0.905    1.107  0.302    0.816  0.113 
sole parent  1.278  0.212    1.193  0.355    1.478  0.121 
couple with deps  0.820  0.066    0.819  0.049   0.686  0.005 
full time emp  1.076  0.776    1.581  0.097    1.232  0.514 
part time emp  1.019  0.942    1.434  0.200    0.741  0.374 
not in LF   0.880  0.631    1.295  0.363    1.004  0.989 
$400 to 599  0.801  0.194    0.838  0.288    0.773  0.224 
$600 to 799  0.709  0.043   0.729  0.053   0.675  0.068 
$800 to 999  0.750  0.089    0.684  0.021   0.799  0.290 
$1000 to 1499  0.570  0.000   0.709  0.023   0.846  0.391 
$1500 to 1999  0.501  0.000   0.604  0.003   1.023  0.914 
$2000 to 2499  0.436  0.000   0.476  0.000   0.530  0.032 
$2500+  0.286  0.000   0.306  0.000   0.709  0.188 
income not stated  0.660  0.005   0.697  0.012   0.747  0.099 
Very Good  1.217  0.058    1.105  0.287    0.851  0.172 
Good 1.218  0.074    1.085  0.420    0.812  0.108 
Fair  1.586  0.001   1.291  0.062   0.857  0.402 
Poor 1.029  0.915    1.170  0.521    1.283  0.358 
Number LTC  0.905  0.000   0.872  0.000   0.926  0.015 
Table 8: Multinomial Logit Estimates for Time in Cover (Insured only) 













































































































































































































































































< 1 year 1 to <2 years 2 to <5 years
Figure 5: Relative Risk Ratios of Time in Cover by Type (relative to insured more than 5 years) 
   DOCUMENT TITLE GOES HERE 
Appendix: Frequencies of combinations of Reasons 
1 reason  2 reasons 3 reasons
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